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ARGUMENT 
A. OPENING BRIEF COULD NOT PROVIDE WHAT DID NOT EXIST. 
1 In Appellee's reply, cited case law and statute is flawed application, and 
11• • Iv wilh1 "il in1'ill MII ppninq hripf nf Appellar *~i_ *u~ "sues and 
of the trial court's decision making. The critical question remains, did the trial 
court err when entering a judgement unsubstantiatec ie evidence, part 
respecting iiny i iili'iM lii'yniiil ,I icnsornblc don * presen • ' 
did not support any basis in the record for the district court's decision, vis-a'-vis, 
Rule 24(a)(5)(B) Utah Rules of App. ° 
2. As demonstrate^ 
occupies significant lengths of the short record without shedding any light on how 
it was derived from the evidence (Op. Br. pg. 2 pg.13-16; Rec< og. 62:2-
7) ll«'i iiuse the ili'pliiclcouri: iresteuui ::*» 
objective representative of the evidence, does fiv.' JJICJUV; a l l y O n U S O n A j j p ^ i i a i i i 
beyond that submitted in opening brief (Op. Br. pg. 2; pg. 8 at para 3, pg. 9: para 
2&3, 20.&paic 
3. In fact, Appellee's rrp offers its own misconstrued derivative of the trial 
evident, i • I< 11 u»il • . 11, \p an uns ' ' i litany as attributable basis for the trial 
court's ruling. Despite preponderance of case law cited by Appellee, nuilhoi 
Appellant or Appellee could have or did, provided what is not thorp I P| > pi i fi 1 
para. 3 & pg. 32 para. 1). 
B. APPELLEE'S DISTORTIONS OF OPENING BRIEF ARE DISINGENUOUS 
4. Examples of reply's selective-error-filled renditions are lengthy and 
patently erroneous including that opening brief was Appellant arguing that he "was 
in an emergency situation and should be allowed to violate traffic laws" (Rp. pg. 
10: para. 5). Neither has Appellant (nor as a Defendant at trial) made any such 
arguments (Op. Br. pgs. 15-16). Stewart called 911 sometime upon entering the 
southbound 1-15 freeway, after being injured at a remote construction sight 
location that was difficult to find even for experienced sub-contractors who had 
directions (Op. Br. pgs. 3-4: para. 1-2). By that time he elected to proceed to a 
location with which he was familiar in Bountiful City, also declining ambulance 
service, which did not impact Stewart's following traffic laws and driving prudently 
to get to emergency care (ibid also Op. Br. pgs. 7-8 1st para.). Whether Stewart 
was prudent in deciding his welfare rested on himself rather than waiting for 
ideally deployed ambulance care to arrive is not at issue (Op. Br. pg. 3 para 2). 
5. What Appellee does not venture with replay is any basis in fact for the 
trial court ignoring the evidence (including its own finding) that Stewart was 
proceeding at all times with "heavy rush hour traffic" (Op. Br. pg. 11 para. 16; pg. 
12 para. 17). Exceptionally this is shown in opening brief for the relevant point 
along 1000 to 1100 East where 500 South street narrows from two lanes to one 
lane and traffic flow though concomitant signals would have no prospect to have 
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exceeded the speed limit (ibid). Further, it is unquestioned and only lightly 
acknowledged in Appellee's replay, that Stewart's truck attracted Officer Bell's 
attention for no other reason than its emergency lights were activated. She did not 
have her radar gun activated and could not have selected Stewart's or any vehicle 
from heavy enfilade traffic flow (Rp. pg. 5: para. 3; pg. 10-11: 1st para; Op.Br. pg. 
11 para. 14; pg. 8: 2nd para). 
6. There is no contradiction that Stewart did appropriately stop for Bell at the 
1100 East 500 South intersection and for which Bell admitted that she "[I] was not 
pursuing your vehicle" (Rd. pg. 10: 6; Op.Rp. 12: para 18). At best the trial court 
ignored its own rather significant experience and finding that 500 South "had 
heavy traffic" at such times of the day (and evidently did not find Bell credible that 
there was not any traffic). It is not plausible finding for Stewart to be speeding 
where this road junctions to one lane and all traffic comes to nearly a stand still 
going through traffic lights (Op. Br. pg. 4-5 para. 4). The trial officer's ruling for 
failure to stop is not supportable by the record and contradict Bell's admission that 
she was not pursuing Stewart (Op. Br. pg. 5: para 7). 
7. To suggest Stewart was evading after having stopped at 1100 East 
intersection to inform Bell of his serious injury and intentions to proceed to the 
Lake View Emergency, is blatantly false argument (Op. Br. pg. 9 2nd para.). This is 
depicted from Bell's actions in deactivating her pursuit lights upon calling Bountiful 
communications for the first time, and conclusively a showing she was not 
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thereafter in pursuit of Stewart (Rp. pg. 22 1st para; Op.Br. pg. 13 para. 19). 
Whether trial court is accustomed to a conspicuous disregard for the evidence 
should not be excused by an appeal to demeanor findings here by Appellee (Rp. 
pg. 17 2nd para). 
8. If anything, as stated in opening brief, the trial was rife with judicial 
over-reaching and abuses which among others, the hearing officer subjecting the 
Defendant (Appellant) to leading, often verbose and loaded questioning. Several 
such instances are evident at trial where the Defendant was confronted with 
ameliorating his answers to avoid entrapment (Op. Br. pg. 13 at para 20, also 
Record 54:16-25; 55). 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DEMEANOR FINDINGS, IF ANY, ARE 
UNDERMINED AND DEFIED BY THE RECORD 
9. Appellee wishes to bolster its arguments for dismissal on technical 
grounds by suggesting the hearing officer somehow made adverse credibility 
findings to the Defendant that effectively erases overpowering evidence (Rp. 23 
3rd para). In fact, if the hearing officer ever made such demeanor finding it would 
be in defiance of the record, but is not anywhere supportable that he did. The 
contrary is shown in any evidence that differed from that presented at trial by 
Stewart, such as Bell's recollections and dissembling testimony including: memory 
regarding advice of superiors Creil and Gilbert to "let this matter drop;" whether 
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hospital staff advised her she could not enter emergency treatment room for 
Stewart, regarding traffic flow relevant to "rush hour" conditions for which even the 
hearing officer evidently was aware from his own experiences (Op. Br. 8: para 
3;12: 17; 12-13: para. 18; Rd: 57: 17-18; 62:19-21; 23-25; 63: 1-2), whether 
informed at the traffic stop of Stewart's injury (Op.Br. pg. 5 para. 7; pg. 6 para. 8), 
and others. 
10. Appellant will agree the hearing officer attempted to attribute Stewart with 
having "an attitude;" but this is not substantiated at any place in the evidence. The 
opposite was true of Stewart's actions and against a convoluted mind set to 
suggesting that he was somehow responsible for Bell's behavior. His statement 
that Bell could not be expected "to be perfect" while castigating Stewart for 
moving with traffic to get to the hospital for medical attention is culpable (Rd. 63: 
17-20). Nothing exists to support that Stewart was not in compliance of even Bell's 
egregious order for a blood-soaked Stewart to re-park his truck before being 
allowed to enter the hospital for emergency treatment of a severe wound (Op. Br. 
13-14: para. 20-21; Rd. 63:14-20). Bell admitted prima fascia that she was "not 
pursuing Stewart" (Op.Br. pg. 6: para. 7); that within one block of encountering 
Stewart she did not have her radar gun turned on. (Op.Br. pg. 5 para. 5). One 
block later, where Stewart had stopped and informed Bell of injury and intentions 
to proceed to hospital, Bell made her first call to Bountiful Communications and 
turned off her pursuit lights (Op.Br. pg. 6). During testimony, Bell denied any 
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knowledge of superiors and hospital staff attempts at lending the situation with 
reasonable judgement. Instead of proving assistance in an emergency, Bell 
presented herself as an impediment to the situation. These are glaring errors that 
show a dilemma for the hearing office to arrive at where he did. Such should not 
lend itself even for "traffic court" and should be dealt with according to the equities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellee's treatment of the nexus of the case is out of context excerpts. Such are 
misleading both going to evidentiary or even demeanor findings adverse to 
Appellant. Even Bell's own testimony shows otherwise. Appellee's reply is 
characterized by the deceptive postulate that Stewart thought "he was in an 
emergency situation and should be allowed to violate traffic laws." Appellee's reply 
is fife with half truths and outright false statements. Therefore, Appellee's reply 
should be compared with opening brief, and the record side by side to determine 
the context of actual circumstances. One example, is suggesting that somehow 
Bell activating her emergency lights (if she did) while traveling in the opposite 
direction, would be known to Stewart and/or the line up of rush hour traffic going in 
a direction opposed to that of Bell. Or for that matter, that they would have had 
room to pull off the road in such traffic? This all materialized within one block of 
where Bell first noticed Stewart at 1000 East and he turned around at 1100 East 
intersection? The fact that Bell did not arrive to the 1100 East intersection to even 
know that Stewart had stopped there to ask directions speaks how this evolved 
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(Op. Br. pg. 11 para. 14). Without making verbatim quotations, Appellant's opening 
brief did fairly represent the trial court's decision making for what it was, an 
unbecoming denunciation, not supportable by the evidence or even by the trial 
officer's own experience and finding for 500 South traffic conditions (at 7:00 p.m 
summer rush hour conditions). The record and opening brief poise substantial 
factual basis for what should have been reasoned decision making by the district 
court. Appellee here suggests technical basis and a contrived reading of the record 
to support dismissal without consideration of the equities. Certainly, Appellant is 
not asking a de novo review, as suggested by Appellee, but that at some point 
(herein) the equities be determinative. These unabashed characterizations are out 
of context for opening brief. This is thin tissue Appellee suggests for salvaging a 
suspect and conclusively flawed trial. It should be taken for what it is worth and this 
matter reversed in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter Noel Stewart, Pro Se 
4730 Mile High Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
(801)787-2363 
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